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ABSTRACT
This contribution to the science of consciousness aims at
comparing how two different theories can explain the emer-
gence of different qualia experiences: meta-awareness, meta-
cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive
therapy, meditation-induced brain changes, etc. The first
theory postulates that qualia experiences derive from specific
neural patterns, and the second one that qualia experiences
derive from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with the
brain’s neural activity. From this comparison, it will be possible
to judge which one seems to better explain the different qualia
experiences and to offer a more promising research agenda.
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness, mind, the whole psyche, and soul have been
one of the most relevant and puzzling problems since the
origin of philosophy and psychology. The speculations on their
nature date back to pre-Socratic philosophers (like Pitagoras)
in the West, as well as Veda tradition, Yoga, and Buddhism in
the East.
A huge interest on consciousness has raised up in the last
three decades, and a wealth of data on its neurophysiological,
physical, molecular, psychological, and behavioral aspects is
now available in the literature (e.g., Churchland, 2013; Cohen
& Schooler, 2014; Dehaene, 2014). Consciousness is not a
strictly medical topic but encompasses the fields of psycho-
logy, biology, physics, as well as epistemology and philosophy
with an increasing need of interdisciplinary efforts and
exchange of ideas.
The complexity of the problem and the width of involved
fields of knowledge suggest the need for an open-minded
approach, able to avoid any inadvertently prejudicial, dog-
matic stance, based on one’s formation and beliefs. It also pre‐
vents one to properly discuss the whole topic within the space
of an article. Therefore, the aim here is only to compare the
interpretation of a series of phenomena listed in Table 1, from
two different theoretical approaches.
In this article, we will use the term “Qualia” (Q) as referring to
the first-person conscious awareness of both physical and
mental information, for example, “I see a red rose”, “I feel
happy” (Michael, 2015). These phenomenological reports can
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also be nonverbal. We prefer Q instead of “Consciousness”
because the term Consciousness is often used to define both
an ontological state and a state of mind.
Independently of every philosophical point of view, regardless
of scholarly philosophical theories positing that Qs are merely
illusions and we are simply “zombies” (e.g., Wegner, 2004),
there is no doubt that without Qs there cannot be any sort
of overt (explicit) knowledge of the inner (mental) and outer
worlds even if it is still possible to show very advanced
adaptive behaviors like that observed in modern robots.
Consequently, if an organism has explicit knowledge, then it
is not possible that the it does not have Qualia. Qs hence
became a necessary condition for explicit knowledge of
mental and external events.
How is it possible to have experiences of this kind? In the
following, we will compare two competing types of theories.
The first one, based on physicalist metaphysics, postulates
that Qs are nothing but (eliminative reductionism) or an
emerging (constitutive reductionism) neural activity of brain
activity triggered by external and internal processes (e.g.,
Schwartz, Lilienfeld, Meca, & Sauvigné, 2016). Eliminative
reductionism, at its core, subsumes that all mental phenomena
can be explained by the functioning of their neurological
correlates, which will make superfluous any mental inter-
pretation of all human and nonhuman behaviors. Differently,
emerging reductionism postulates that at some level of
complex interactions among the low-level brain components,
higher level of brain functioning with different properties with
Table 1. Local Q experiences.
Q Experiences Mind = Brain Proto-consciousness (PC)↔Brain
1. Cognitive therapy–induced brain changes
(Messina, Sambin, Palmieri, &
Viviani, 2013)
Brain correlates of therapist suggestions change
brain correlates of emotional, behavioral, and
other dysfunctions.
PC realizes Qs following the
therapeutic suggestions changing
their neural substrate
2. Meditation-induced brain changes (Tang,
Hölzel, & Posner, 2015; Tomasino &
Fabbro, 2015)
Brain correlates of meditation status change its
functional characteristics.
PC guides Qs to control mental
activity and its neural substrate.
3. Hypnosis (Cardeña, Jönsson, Terhune, &
Marcusson-Clavertz, 2013)
Brain correlates of hypnotic suggestions change
the associated brain functional characteristics.
PC guides Qs to follow the hypnotic
suggestions.
4. Placebo (Stewart-Williams, & Podd, 2004) Brain correlates of expectations activate their
brain and physiological correlates.
PC guides Qs to affect physiology as
expected.
5. Meta-awareness (Schooler, 2015) The brain describes its contents to itself by an
emerging recurrent feedback.
PC reflects on and monitors Qs.
6. Feeling of personal ownership of one’s
mental states (Klein, 2015)
Brain damages and induced brain activity
modifications affect Qs.
Brain damages and induced brain
activity modifications affect how PC
realizes Qs.
7. Meta-cognition (Dunlosky &
Metcalfe, 2008)
The brain can describe its contents to itself by an
emerging recurrent feedback.
PC can reflect on and monitor Qs.
8. Mind-wandering (Schooler et al., 2011) The brain can describe its contents to itself by an
emerging recurrent feedback.
PC can reflect on and monitor Qs.
9. Awareness of flow of time (Block, 2014) The brain can describe its contents to itself by an
emerging recurrent feedback.
PC can reflect on and monitor Qs
10. Lucid dreams (Gackenbach &
LaBerge, 2012).
The brain can describe its dream content to itself
by an emerging recurrent feedback.
PC-guided Qs can reflect on and
monitor dream content.
11. Free will (Bode at al., 2014;
Haggard, 2008)
It emerges from nondeterministic patterns of
brain activity.
PC is not bound by the causal chain
of cognitive and motor processes.
12. Bistable perceptions (Kim & Blake, 2005) Qs differences correspond to different brain
activity patterns.
PC realizes Qs differences by
interpreting different brain activity
patterns.
13. Qs with a partial brain (Forsdyke, 2015;
Muckli, Naumer, & Singer, 2009).
Cognitive functions reorganize their neural
networks.
PC may realize Qs by using the
partial brain.
14. Left vs right hemisphere Qs differences in
split-brain (Gazzaniga, 2005)
The left brain’s specialization allows it to describe
its own and the right brain’s contents to itself.
PC realizes Qs by using the left
hemisphere in split-brain patients.
15. Nontraumatic or induced with specific
brain stimulation out-of-body experiences
(Carruthers, 2015)
They emerge from the activity of specific brain
networks.
PC Qs are dissociated from the body,
but not from the brain.
16. Near-death experiences (Facco, Agrillo, &
Greyson, 2015; Nelson, 2014)
Near-death experiences are a byproduct of the
residual brain activity during and after cardiac arrest.
PC remains active even with a
reduced and altered brain activity.
17. Nontraumatic mystical experiences
(Wulff, 2014).
They emerge from the activity of specific brain
networks.
PC-guided Qs interact symbolically
with its origin.
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respect to their constituents, for example, motives, emotions,
and personality traits, will come out which could also in‐
fluence causally the underlying brain activity.
The second one, based on interactionist metaphysics, postu-
lates that Qs arise by an interaction between a nonlocal proto-
consciousness (PC) or proto-mind, which interacts as an
“Interpreter” using Gazzaniga’s terminology1 (Gazzaniga, 2011;
Roser & Gazzaniga, 2006), and a “Decision Maker” with the
neural information produced by the brain activity. As PC we
mean a mind-like primordial substance, the physical laws of
which have yet to be investigated (see paragraph 3.1 PC
Research Agenda), similar to the description put forward by
Hameroff and Penrose (2014) and Beauregard (2014).
An alternative to an interactionist metaphysics, but which
forecast the same effects as due to the primacy of a mental
versus a material substrate, is the mental monism with all its
variants, idealism, panpsychism, and the more recent non-
physical realism (Staune, 2013) and dual-aspect monism
(Atmanspacher, 2012) metaphysics.
These two competing theories are represented in Figure 1.
Interactive theories like this one are not new in the debate
about mind–brain relationships (Zalta, 2013). We may cite
Popper and Eccles’s (2012; “The Self and Its Brain”) theory as an
example or the more recent Mario Beauregard’s (2014) “Theory
of Psychelementarity” (TOP). What is new in the present article is
the presentation of a list of Q phenomena and how well each
competing theory serves as an explanation for them.
At the end of this list, we will confine ourselves to outlining
the gaps each theory must fill in order to shed light on how
the different Q phenomena can be explained. We will leave it
to the reader to choose which of the two theories is more
plausible or, perhaps, just less weird.
It is important to point out that both theories have in common
the fact that every Q experience is correlated to a specific
and unique neural signature, elicited by the spatial–temporal
patterns of brain activity which can be recorded with tradi‐
tional means, for example, fMRI, EEG, MEG. The crucial dif‐
ference concerns how Q phenomena relate to brain activity.
DIFFERENT QUALIA PHENOMENA TO BE EXPLAINED
In Table 1, we will illustrate how the two competing theories
try to explain different within the body (local) Q experiences.
In Table 2, we will present how the two theories try to explain
some Q experiences that are achieved beyond the range of
sensory and motor organs (nonlocal). For each of these ex‐
periences, we will indicate some references selected in order
to offer a more comprehensive explanation.
THE RESEARCH AGENDA
These research agenda fit well with Chalmers’ (2013) project
5 “Systematize the connection” between first-person data
and third-person data for the construction of a science of
consciousness.
3.1 Research agenda for the PC–Brain connection:
1 What is the physics and biology of the PC–Brain
interaction?
2 How does the PC “interpret” brain activity to achieve
the different Qs?
3 Is it possible to detect non-Q PC effects?
4 Which is the origin and nature of PC?
Regardless of what the PC is made of, it must exert a physical
action on the brain, both for the realization of Qs based on the
monitoring of cognitive activities like mind-wandering, meta-
awareness, and by a process of interpretation of their specific
neural correlates and also particularly for the Qs that involve
a modification of brain activity (e.g., placebo and meditation).
Using Beauregard’s term, this relationship must imply a
“Psychoneural Transduction Mechanism” (PTM).
A well-known candidate for this PTM is the Orch-OR (Orche-
strated-Objective Reduction) theory as proposed by Penrose
and Hameroff (Hameroff, 2007, 2012; Hameroff & Penrose,
2014), which postulates that Qs arise from quantum-like
processes2 of quantum superposition decoherence between
proto-conscious information and the microtubules of brain
neurons. A comprehensive description of this theory and its
criticisms is beyond the scope of this article but is fully
available in the cited references.
Another PTM candidate is the Schwartz, Stapp, and Beauregard’s
(2005) “Neurophysical Model of Mind.” Like the Orch-OR
theory, this model is also based on a quantum-like approach.
In its essence, this approach is based on the “physics of the
observer” as postulated by Von Neumann Wigner and others
(Stapp, 2011), that is, on the active and essential role of
conscious human choices in the definition of the status of
observed (measured) physical properties of nature. The
purported mind–brain connection is based on the Zeno effect3
Figure 1. Mind=Brain (left) and Proto-consciousness interacting
with the brain (right) schematic representation.
1. Even if Gazzaniga’s interpretation is that this role is an
emerging property of the brain.
2. Interpreting some biological and mental phenomena like
those observed in quantum physics.
3. A series of observations after short periods of time affect the
probability that the system will be in in a given state, for
example, A rather than in state B. In quantum physics, the
repeated observation prevents the transition of the system
into the decay state.
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that permits “free choices” on the part of an observer to
influence his or her brain (Stapp, 2009).
The puzzling neural phenomenon of the anticipation of the
neural activity related to free choices with respect to their
subjective experience (e.g., Libet, 2006; Soon, He, Bode, &
Haynes, 2013; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008) could be
interpreted as a sign of the PTM which requires some time to
elicit a Q from the interaction with neural activity.
The attempt to explain some psychological phenomena by
referring to the theoretical, mathematical, and statistical tools
of quantum physics has already been quite successful in the
research field known as “Quantum Cognition” (Bruza, Wang,
and Busemeyer, 2015; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2013). This ap‐
proach has already proven to be more precise than the
classical probability approach in the explanations of some
cognitive functions in the reasoning, decision-making, and
perception domains.
With respect to the nonlocal Qs, it is quite obvious that the PC
too must express nonlocal characteristics—that is, character-
istics devoid of space and time boundaries. Is there evidence
of a reality where space and time are not absolute and the
properties of space- and/or time-separated physical objects
may be correlated? This is the apparently weird world of
quantum physics, the characteristics of which are not only
described at a theoretical level (even if the interpretations are
still hotly debated) but supported by overwhelming experi-
mental and technological evidence (e.g., Greenberger, Reiter, &
Zeilinger, 2013; Vedral, 2014)
Is it possible to postulate not only local but also nonlocal
quantum-like biological and mental phenomena? This is the
frontier of the theoretical and empirical investigation for
any PC–brain interaction hypothesis. Fortunately, there are
already some contributions of this type to start with. For
example, nonlocal spatial and temporal correlations between
mental, physical, and biological systems are expected within
the Generalized Quantum Theory (Walach & Römer, 2011;
Walach & von Stillfried, 2011). An attempt to interpret all the
more recent empirical evidence related to both nonlocal Qs
and implicit behavioral and neurophysiological responses
(e.g., Bem, Tressoldi, Rabeyron, & Duggan, 2015; Mossbridge,
Tressoldi, & Utts, 2012) within this theoretical framework is
offered by Walach, Tressoldi, and Pederzoli (2016).
RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE MIND=BRAIN THEORY
1 How do first-person Q experiences emerge from the
neural patterns of the brain?
2 Do Qs emerge only from the neural patterns of the
brain or also from other artificial complex physical
signals?
3 How can these Qs causally change brain activity?
4 How can nonlocal mind phenomena be explained?
5 How do Qs become reorganized with a partial innate
brain?
6 How do “free” choices emerge from nondeterministic
neural patterns?
The above is a research agenda somewhere in between the radical
hypothesis that Qs aremere illusions (like freewill), and the quite
pessimistic agenda put forth by Adolphs (2015) (who situates the
question, “How and why does conscious experience arise?" in the
“we may never solve” category) and Uttal (2016) whose conclu-
sions states: “At the present time, my overall conclusion is that
searching for the neural foundations of cognitive mechanisms
(i.e., developing an overarching neuroreductionist theory of the
mind using macroneural techniques) is a goal unlikely to be
achieved. The use of fMRI systems to explain how the brain
produces mental activity is simply being carried out at the wrong
level of analysis. I agree with Page (2006), who asserted … the
huge investment of time and money that has accompanied this
trend [functional brain imaging] has not resulted in a correspond-
ing theoretical advancement, at least with respect to cognitive
psychological theory” (Uttal, 2016, p. 428).
A complete description of all theoretical and empirical ap‐
proaches currently active exceeds the scope of the present
article; hence, we will describe only a selection of them.
Further information is available from Seth (2007).
Cleeremans’ “Radical Plasticity Thesis” postulates that “The
brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its
own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-repre-
sentations that characterize and qualify the target first-order
Table 2. Nonlocal Q experiences.
Q Experiences Mind = Brain Proto-consciousness (PC)↔Brain
1. Nonlocal perception (Tressoldi, 2011) Impossible PC Qs express their nonlocal perceptual
characteristics.
2. Nonlocal interaction with physical targets (Bösch, Steinkamp, &
Boller, 2006)
Impossible Some PC Qs express their nonlocal interaction
characteristics.
3. Nonlocal interaction with biological targets (Roe, Sonnex, &
Roxburgh 2014)
Impossible Some PC Qs express their nonlocal interaction
characteristics.
4. Mediumship (Beischel, Boccuzzi, Biuso, & Rock, 2015) Impossible Some PC Qs survive to the brain.
5. Witnessed OBEs (Parnia et al., 2014; van Lommel, van Wees,
Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001)
Impossible PC and brain might separate from each other.
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representations. Such learned redescriptions, enriched by
the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of
conscious experience” (Cleeremans, 2011, p. 1).
Another well-known theory is Dehaene’s “Global Neuronal
Workspace Theory” (Baars, 2002; Dehaene, 2014). The core
of this theory is that Qs emerge from a nonlinear activity
of a complex neural network constituted by long-range
corticocortical connections related to sensory and cognitive
processes according to their salience.
Tononi and Koch’s (2015) “Integrated Information Theory”
(IIT) holds that consciousness is a fundamental property
possessed by physical systems having specific properties, for
example, with a cause–effect power, with cause–effect struc-
ture and with a conceptual structure.
Given that according to the above theories—and all those that
postulate a mind/brain identity—brain activity is regulated
only by linear and nonlinear information processing regulated
by classical physics, nonlocal Qs are completely at odds
because they violate the spatial and temporal boundaries of
classical communication.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The emergence of Qs and their functions are at the core of
every theory of consciousness. In this article, we compared the
explanatory power and future research agenda of two oppos-
ing types of theories to explain a list of local and nonlocal Q
experiences.
The best type of theory must explain all of the Q experiences
listed in Tables 1 and 2.
In light of the available evidence and the actual explanatory
power, which is the weirder?
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